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APPELLATE REVIEW OF LANHAM ACT
VIOLATIONS: Is LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION A QUESTION OF LAW
OR FACT?
by Bret Thomas Reynolds
HE law of unfair competition developed from the equitable notion
that one should not reap what one has not sown.' The protection of
trademarks is only one branch of the law of unfair competition,2
whose objectives include the protection of honest businessmen, the punish-
ment of dishonest competitors who divert business from others by unfair
means, and the protection of the public from deception.3 Prior to 1938 a
well-established body of federal common law governed unfair competition
cases. The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Erie Railroad v,
Tompkins4 eviscerated this body of federal common law,5 forcing federal
courts to use inconsistent and poorly developed state law when faced with
unfair competition claims.6 Both the old federal and state common law
severely restricted unfair competition claims, recognizing only certain
strictly construed categories. 7 These included palming off,8 falsely describ-
ing oneself to be the source of a product that is produced exclusively by
1. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918).
2. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
3. Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910); Vitascope Co.
v. U.S. Phonograph Co., 83 F. 30, 32-33 (C.C.D.N.J. 1897); J.N. Collins Co. v. F.M. Paist
Co., 14 F.2d 614, 615 (E.D. Pa. 1926); 1 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
& MONOPOLIES § 1.24 (4th ed. 1983).
4. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (state common law governs areas of substantive law).
5. See Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REV. 987, 991
(1949).
6. See Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of the
Lanham Act. Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1957).
7. See Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. You've
Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J. 84, 85 (1973); Note, The Lanham
Trademark Act, Section 43(a)-A Hidden National Law of Unfair Competition, 14 WASH-
BURN L.J. 330, 332 (1975). These restrictive rules allowed only a plaintiff suffering direct
injury from a competitor to sue. See Germain, supra, at 86.
8. Palming off occurs when one seller of goods adopts the symbol or mark of another
to mislead the public into believing that it is purchasing the goods of another. American
Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 284 (6th Cir. 1900).
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another,9 and false designations of a product's origin.'0
Congress, recognizing the need for standardized guidelines to govern
nationwide marketing of products," enacted the Lanham Trademark
Act,' 2 which once again gave federal courts a uniform body of substantive
law by which to interpret unfair competition claims.' 3 The Lanham Act
not only codified the common law as it existed before Erie,14 but also cre-
ated a new statutory tort of false representation of goods in commerce.' 5
The Act resulted in a loosening of the common law rules and the dissolu-
tion of strict categories for unfair competition claims.' 6
Section 45 of the Lanham Act explicitly states that Congress intended to
regulate commerce by protecting against the deceptive use of trademarks
and preventing unfair competition. 17 This section of the Act has en-
couraged liberal interpretations of the other sections to effectuate a broad
9. See Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'don
other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
10. See Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d 245, 252
(7th Cir. 1942). Competitors could also bring a class action for false designation of origin.
Id.
11. See Note, The Problem of Functional Features.- Trade Dress Infringement Under Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 78 (1982).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
13. See Derenberg, supra note 6, at 1030. For extensive discussions of the Lanham
Act's effects on the law of unfair competition, see Comment, Analysis ofa Statutory Violation
ofthe Lanham Act § 43(a), 29 MERCER L. REV. 1083 (1978); Comment, The Present Scope of
Recoveryfor Unfair Competition Violations Under Section 43(a) ofthe Lanham Act, 58 NEB.
L. REV. 159 (1979).
14. Congress attempted to codify the common law in the Trademark Act of 1920, ch.
104, 41 Stat. 533. Suits under this Act were rarely brought, however, because the plaintiff
was required to prove that the defendant misrepresented the origin of its product "willfully
and with an intent to deceive." Id. § 3. Plaintiffs relied instead on the well-developed com-
mon law. Few, if any, decisions granted relief under this Act, and its significance lies in the
fact that § 3 is the precursor of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, see infra note 20, which is now
the basis for a broad range of unfair competition claims. See Derenberg, supra note 6, at
1034-35.
15. In L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954), the
court rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff was required to prove palming off
to recover under the Lanham Act, stating that "[it seems to us that Congress has defined a
statutory civil wrong of false representation of goods in commerce and has given a broad
class of suitors injured or likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in the federal
courts." Id. See also Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C.) (holding
explicitly that § 43(a) created a new statutory tort), affd sub nom. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.
v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
16. See Germain, supra note 7, at 88. See also Purolator v. EFRA Distrib., Inc., 687
F.2d 554, 560-61 (1st Cir. 1982) (§ 43(a) of Lanham Act creates federal tort broader than
common law concerning unfair competition and trademark infringement).
17. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982) provides in part:
The intent of this [Act] is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress
by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such com-
merce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference
by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such com-
merce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such com-
merce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits or colorable imitations
of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties
and conventions respecting trade-marks, trade names, and unfair competition
entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
[Vol. 38
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level of protection consistent with the scope of congressional power.18 Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act outlaws not only false designations of ori-
gin; 19 any false descriptions or representations concerning goods or
services are forbidden as well.20 Furthermore, section 43(a) abandons the
old common law policy that required a showing of direct competitive in-
jury as a prerequisite to a successful unfair competition claim and provides
that any person who believes that he is likely to be damaged may bring
suit.2' Although section 43(a) was conservatively interpreted for a period
following enactment, 22 the Act has now been broadly applied to protect
against deceptive marketing, packaging, and advertising of goods and
services in commerce. 23
Section 32 of the Act specifically provides protection against trademark
infringement. 24 Sections 32 and 43(a) are closely related, however, since
18. Germain, supra note 7, at 89-90.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). False designation of origin was also prohibited at com-
mon law. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20. Lanham Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation
of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with
knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or repre-
sentation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or
deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a
civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as
that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.
21. Id. See generally Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127,
1136 n.13 (2d Cir. 1982) (competitive injury not required for recovery under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)); McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1134-35 (2d Cir. 1979)
(the law is concerned with indirect harm through loss of goodwill and tarnishment of reputa-
tion rather than simply direct diversion of purchasers) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 730 comment b (1977)).
22. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir.
1951) (palming off is still required to state a claim under § 43(a)); Samson Crane Co. v.
Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass. 1949) (only false representations
tantamount to trademark infringement are actionable).
23. See, e.g., Keebler v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 371-78 (1st Cir. 1980)
(packaging); New West Corp. v. NYM Co., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198-1203 (9th Cir. 1979) (decep-
tive marketing); Frisch's Restaurant, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 514 F. Supp. 704, 709-12 (S.D.
Ohio), affd, 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 103 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982)
(advertising); see also Note, supra note I1, at 79 (§ 43(a) focuses on deceptive representa-
tions of products in general rather than specifically on trademark infringement).
24. Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l) (1982) provides:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imi-
tation of a registered mark in connection with a sale, . . . distribution or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements in-
tended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection
1984]
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trademark infringement is simply part of the broader law of unfair compe-
tition.25 The law of unfair competition is based on the idea that a business
should not sell its goods in such a manner that the consumer is misled into
believing that the goods were manufactured by another; 26 trademark in-
fringement is one of the easiest ways to make a product appear to be that
of another. 27 Because trademark infringement claims are governed by the
same principles as suits for unfair competition, 28 lawsuits seeking relief
under section 32 often incorporate allegations under section 43(a) as
well.29 For purposes of this Comment, however, the most important link
between sections 32 and 43(a) is their requirement that the plaintiff show
that the defendant's actions created a likelihood of confusion with respect
to goods or services.30 Section 32 specifically requires the plaintiff to show
that the defendant created a likelihood of confusion; 3' although section
43(a) does not explicitly require such a showing, the requirement has been
adopted sub silentio by the federal judiciary when construing actions
brought under section 43(a).32
The harmony at the trial court level in adopting the standard by which
potential violations of the Lanham Act are judged has unfortunately
eluded the circuit courts in their attempts to fashion a standard of review.
The circuit courts disagree on the amount of discretion permitted them
when reviewing a finding of likelihood of confusion. 33 Traditionally, a
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to
deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
25. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510
F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 1968); Heaton Distrib. Co. v. Union Tank Car
Co., 387 F.2d 477, 483 (8th Cir. 1967).
26. American-Marriettaa Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1960); 1 R.
CALLMAN, supra note 3, § 2.02.
27. American-Marriettaa Co. v. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 287 (2d Cir. 1960).
28. National Auto. Club v. National Auto Club, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 879, 881 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. v. Couri, 220 F. Supp. 929, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
29. The inclusion of claims under both sections seems to have become common prac-
tice. See, e.g., Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (2d
Cir. 1982) (alleging, inter alia, trademark infringement under § 32(1) of the Lanham Act and
various false representations under § 43(a) of the Act); Pignons S.A. de Mecanique v. Polar-
oid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 485 (1st Cir. 1981) (alleging trademark infringement and unfair
competition under both sections of the Act); McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599
F.2d 1126, 1129-30 (2d Cir. 1979) (alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition
under both sections of the Act).
30. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 842 (3d Cir.
1983) (gist of proceeding under either § 32 or § 43(a) of the Lanham Act is a claim of false
representation that is likely to cause confusion); Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube &
Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443 (9th Cir. 1980) (likelihood of confusion was central issue
when plaintiff alleged infringement, unfair competition, and false designation of origin).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982); see supra note 24.
32. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir.
1983); Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distributors, Inc., 687 F.2d 554, 561 (Ist Cir. 1982); Boston
Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg. Co., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012-1013
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
33. Elby's Big Boys, Inc. v. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 231, 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d
182, 182-83 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (split as to whether district court's finding of likeli-
[Vol. 38
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trial court's finding on the issue of likelihood of confusion has been viewed
as a finding of fact, and, therefore, governed on appeal by rule 52 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 34 Under rule 52 circuit courts may not
reverse a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly errone-
ous. 35 A trend has developed in some circuits in the last twenty years,
however, to treat a finding of likelihood of confusion as a legal conclusion,
therefore allowing a wider latitude for reviewing Lanham Act claims.36
Although the Supreme Court recently passed up an opportunity to resolve
the issue, 37 clues regarding eventual resolution of the issue are provided in
a recent opinion on trademark infringement brought under section 32 of
the Lanham Act. 38
This Comment first defines the elements of the likelihood of confusion
standard and then analyzes the different approaches toward appellate re-
view of the standard taken by the various circuits. The implications of a
recent Supreme Court case construing the Lanham Act on the resolution
of the likelihood of confusion issue are also discussed. Finally, this Com-
ment presents an analysis of the differing applications of certain Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to the likelihood of confusion issue.
I. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION: WHO IS CONFUSED ABOUT WHAT?
The gravamen of an action for trademark infringement and unfair com-
petition is that the defendant's actions must have created a likelihood of
confusion between his goods and those of another.39 Likelihood of confu-
sion involves both the right of the public not to be confused by dishonest
competitors and the right of business owners to benefit from the goodwill
and reputation that their time and money have established. 40 The empha-
hood of confusion is reviewable as question of fact or of law); 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADE-
MARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23.22, at 78 (1973).
34. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 33, § 23.22, at 78.
35. FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a) provides in part: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses."
36. See infra notes 154-68, 183, and accompanying text.
37. Elby's Big Boys, Inc. v. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 231, 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d
182, 182-83 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White dissented on the ground that the
Court should have used the opportunity to resolve the conflict).
38. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982) (action for trade-
mark infringement under § 32 of the Act). For a complete discussion of the case, see infra
notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
39. Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1129 (2d Cir. 1982);
Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distrib., Inc., 687 F.2d 554, 559 (1st Cir. 1982); Chevron Chem. Co.
v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 703 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1126 (1982); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); K-S-H Plastics, Inc. v. Carolite, Inc., 408 F.2d 54, 57 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969); 3A R. CALLMAN, supra note 6, § 20.01.
40. See, e.g., James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th
Cir. 1976) ("What is infringed [in a trademark infringement suit] is the right of the public to
be free of confusion and the synonymous right of a trademark owner to control his product's
reputation."); A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Staley Milling Co., 253 F.2d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1958)
(social values influencing trademark law include the public's ability to know that it will get
the products it asks for and the protection of the trademark owner's investment from misap-
19841
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sis on public confusion was explained by Judge Learned Hand in a maxim
that still stands as the touchstone for analysis: "[R]elief always depends
upon the idea that no man should be able to mislead people into supposing
that his goods are the plaintiffs, and . . . there can be no right or remedy
until the plaintiff can show that at least presumptively this will result."' 4'
One element that courts seldom thoroughly define when evaluating the
potential for confusion under the Lanham Act is the nature and capabili-
ties of the class of persons among whom the Act seeks to prevent confu-
sion.42 The lack of definition contributes to the increasing difficulty that
courts are experiencing in determining the merits of Lanham Act claims. 43
The legislative history of the Act evinces a concern for the consuming pub-
lic, 44 and many courts simply define the candidates for confusion as the
"public. '45 Courts occasionally have attempted to formulate a more pre-
cise definition of the class, stating that "an appreciable number of ordina-
rily prudent purchasers" is the group with which the court is concerned
when determining the likelihood of confusion.46
The protected class was construed very broadly in Omega Importing
Corp. v. Petri-kine Camera Co .47 In Omega an East German camera man-
ufacturer sought a temporary injunction against a West German corpora-
tion to prevent the latter from distributing in the United States cameras
that were manufactured under the same trademark as its own.48 The dis-
propriation by pirates); Celotex Co. v. Millington, 49 F.2d 1053, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1931)
(trademark registration laws were designed to protect exclusive use of trademark by one who
builds up goodwill in connection with its use and to protect public against confusion; when
one has established a profitable business using a trademark, "there are to be found many
who flock to the feast, unbidden guests, and fatten themselves at the table which has been
spread").
41. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
42. See, e.g., Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 461 (lst Cir. 1962) (trademark in-
fringement actions as well as unfair competition actions seek to prevent public from being
misled); Oriental Foods, Inc. v. Chun King Sales, Inc., 244 F.2d 909, 915 (9th Cir. 1957) (test
is whether mark will confuse an appreciable number of prospective purchasers); Squirrel
Brand Co. v. Barnard Nut Co., 224 F.2d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 1955) (test is whether average
person will be confused and believe that infringer's products were produced by trademark
owner); Anti-monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 515 F. Supp. 448, 452 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (test applies to average consumer's comprehension); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513
F. Supp. 1339, 1362 (D.N.J. 1981) (trademark infringement actions serve to protect right of
public to be free of confusion).
43. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 820 (1961)) (the question of likelihood of confusion has not become easier with the
passage of time).
44. See H.R. REP. No. 944, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1946); S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1946).
45. See AMP, Inc. v. Foy, 540 F.2d 1181, 1183 (4th Cir. 1976); HMH Publishing Co. v.
Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1974); Volkswagenwerk AG v. Hoffman, 489 F. Supp.
678, 680 (D.S.C. 1980).
46. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538,
542 (2d Cir. 1956).
47. 451 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1971). Although the plaintiff did not sue under the Lanham
Act, the definition of consumer for purposes of determining likelihood of confusion was the
same as under the Lanham Act. Id. at 1194-95.
48. The Ihagee camera business split following WWII when its owner became a resi-
[Vol. 38
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trict court denied the request for injunctive relief on grounds that the cam-
era's purchase price suggested that a buyer willing to expend such an
amount would be knowledgeable about the trademark similarity.4 9 The
Second Circuit stated that the ordinary purchaser, and not the expert, is
the one who must be considered in determining the likelihood of confu-
sion.50 The court suggested that the ordinary purchaser of cameras in-
cludes both the discriminating purchaser and the casual, relatively
unknowledgeable buyer 5' and that consideration must be given to both
categories in determining the probability of confusion. 52 Another court
stated in more blunt fashion that courts must consider both the ignorant
and the intelligent in applying the likelihood of confusion test.53
Other courts, however, have determined that the question of buyer so-
phistication is an important factor in determining the likelihood of confu-
sion.54 The Ninth Circuit followed this reasoning in Alpha Industries, Inc.
v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes.55 The plaintiff in Alpha furnished equip-
ment to companies that manufactured consumer goods from steel tubing,
and the defendant sold the tubing itself to the same manufacturers. The
plaintiff sought to enjoin the tubing supplier from using the name "Alpha"
in doing business. The district court considered the names as a whole, and
concluded that since one company sold under the registered mark "Alpha"
and the other one always used "Alpha" in conjunction with other words,
no likelihood of confusion existed. 56 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, recognizing that the purchasers of the goods were sophisticated
dent of West Germany. The East German government nationalized the business's facilities
located in East Germany and continued to operate the business as an East German corpora-
tion. A dispute arose between the two companies as to the ownership of certain U.S. trade-
marks. Prior litigation in the United States had resolved that the East German corporation
was the lawful owner of the trademarks, but both companies were attempting to sell cameras
under the "Exacta" mark, which brought about this litigation. Id. at 1191-93.
49. Id. at 1193.
50. Id. at 1195.
51. ld.
52. Id. The court cited Oriental Foods, Inc. v. Chun King Sales, Inc., 244 F.2d 909, 915
(9th Cir. 1957). In Oriental Foods the court also stated that "likelihood of confusion cannot
be measured by the effect of the similarity on the rankly careless and unconcerned." 244
F.2d at 915.
53. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 358 F. Supp. 1065, 1091 (D. Nev.),
vacated and remanded, 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1973) (remanded on jurisdictional question).
The Wells Fargo court stated: " 'The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for
the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credu-
lous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances
and general impressions.'" 358 F. Supp. at 1091 (quoting Florence Mfg. Co. v. T.C. Dowd
& Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910)).
54. See, e.g., Drexel Enters. v. Richardson, 312 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1962) (degree of
care likely to be exercised by purchasers is one factor used to determine likelihood of confu-
sion); Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. Coratomic, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Minn. 1982),
af'd, 702 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1983) (no infringement or unfair competition existed because
customers of pacemakers were too sophisticated to be confused); F.S. Servs., Inc. v. Custom
Farm Servs., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 153, 162 (N.D. I11. 1970), af'd, 471 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1972)
(no infringement since purchasers of goods were discriminating buyers capable of discerning
differences between trademarks).
55. 616 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 444.
1984]
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specialists in their field and that the realities of the marketplace should
influence a comparison of the trademarks. 57 This holding is somewhat
questionable, however, because some courts recognize that the technical
aptitude of a consumer protects a potential trademark infringer only to a
limited degree; in fact, when the similarity of the marks becomes too great
and the manner of purchasing routine, an actionable likelihood of confu-
sion often arises, even though the purchasers may be sophisticated techni-
cians.58 Probably the best approach considers the sophistication of the
buyer as only one factor in determining likelihood of confusion, 9 thus
alleviating the danger of immunizing from liability for trademark confu-
sion the manufacturers of goods that will be purchased by technically
trained buyers.60
Another ill-defined element of the likelihood of confusion test is what
the object of the consumer's confusion must be to give rise to a claim
under the Lanham Act.61 Under the original version of the Lanham Act,62
confusion as to the source of goods or businesses was required for an ac-
tionable claim.63 When Congress amended the Act in 1962, however, sec-
tion 32 was broadened by omitting the requirement that the confusion
relate specifically to the source or origin of goods or services.64 The Fifth
Circuit and at least one commentator posit that any kind of confusion is
now sufficient to create an actionable claim under the current provisions of
the Act.65 Apparently the confusion need not relate to similar goods or
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1252 (4th
Cir.) (reversing district court over appellee's contention that purchasers of sophisticated
computers were so knowledgeable that they would not be confused by similar trademarks),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Carlisle Chem. Works, Inc. v. Hardman & Holden, Ltd.,
434 F.2d 1403, 1406 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (trademark registration denied when even discriminat-
mg purchasers would be likely to confuse the appellee's product with that of appellant's);
Rexall Drug & Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 427 F.2d 782, 783 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (defend-
ant was not entitled to registration of its trademark for plastic molding materials since it was
confusingly similar to plaintiffs trademark for similar materials, even though products were
sold to knowledgeable and discriminating buyers).
59. See DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982).
60. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979) (higher stan-
dard may be applied than that of ordinary purchaser when buyer has expertise in the field,
but this should not preclude a finding that confusion is likely); Technic, Inc. v. Sel-Rex
Corp., 419 F.2d 1331, 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (likelihood of confusion existed despite conten-
tions that chemists, the class of buyers at issue, were the most discriminating class of buyers
imaginable).
61. Common law required, with very few exceptions, a showing that the customers
would be confused because of the defendant's attempt to pass his goods off as those of an-
other. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
62. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 32, 60 Stat. 437 (amended 1962).
63. See Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 500 n.5 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979); Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp.,
375 F.2d 857, 860 n.8 (5th Cir. 1967); 3A R. CALLMAN, supra note 3, § 20.01.
64. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat. 769, 773-74 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982)). The phrase "as to source of origin of such goods or
services" was stricken from § 32 by the amendment.
65. Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 500 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979);
Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 860 n.8 (5th Cir.
1967); 3A R. CALLMAN, supra note 3, § 20.05.
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services but may be "absolute" in the sense that the purchaser may be
confused about unrelated goods and services. 66 The plaintiff in a section
32 action for trademark infringement, however, generally must still show
that the alleged infringement is likely to cause confusion concerning the
source of the product.67 Under section 43(a), likelihood of confusion with
respect to the source of the product is influential,68 although the plaintiff
need not allege that the defendant passed his product off as the plaintiffs
in order to state a claim for false description or representation. 69 Little
difference between sections 32 and 43(a) therefore exists in the plaintiffs
burden of proof regarding likelihood of confusion. 70
The following factors are prominent among the many considered by dif-
ferent courts to determine whether likelihood of confusion exists:
(1) the similarity of the marks;
(2) the evidence of actual confusion;
(3) the relationship between the parties' goods and channels of
trade;
(4) the strength of the particular trademarks involved; and
(5) the evidence of intent to confuse. 71
No single factor is determinative. 72 Proof of actual confusion is not neces-
sary to show likelihood of confusion, 73 nor is a showing of intent to con-
fuse.74 The weight given to particular factors by district courts in Lanham
Act claims may depend on the specific type of claim alleged. For example,
in a trademark infringement claim the similarity of the marks themselves
is a highly significant factor,75 while in a false advertising claim whether
the defendant made false representations about the product is of great
importance. 7
6
66. Armstrong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 500 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979);
3A R. CALLMAN, supra note 3, § 20.05.
67. See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir.
1980); King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 631, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), a/i'd, 454
F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1972); John Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Bethea, 305 F. Supp. 1302, 1306-07
(D.S.C. 1969).
68. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 687 F.2d 563, 567
(2d Cir. 1982) (focusing on confusion of source as the more persuasive).
69. See Markel v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1244, 1253-54 (W.D.N.Y.), a/i'd, 610
F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1979); Electronics Corp. of America v. Honeywell, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1230,
1233 (D. Mass.), a/i'd, 487 F.2d 513 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1973).
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71. Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (5th Cir. 1982);
Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982); McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d
1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979).
72. Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1980); J.B. Williams Co. v.
Le Conte Cosmetics, 523 F.2d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
73. Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); Standard Oil Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 74 (10th Cir. 1958).
74. Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distribs., Inc., 687 F.2d 554, 561 (1st Cir. 1982) (intent not
necessary, but intent is relevant since intent to imitate increases likelihood of successfully
inducing confusion).
75. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 687 F.2d 563, 567 (2d Cir.
1982).
76. Universal Athletic Sales v. American Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip., 397 F.
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A district court's evaluation of the evidence and factors involved
culminates in findings of fact. The proper classification of a finding of
likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act as one of fact or of law is
unclear.77 Classification is unavoidable, however, since the consequences
for appellate review are dissimilar. Under rule 52 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a trial court's findings of fact may be reversed only when
clearly erroneous.78 Clearly erroneous findings are those that leave the
circuit court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. 79 If, on the other hand, likelihood of confusion is a legal question,
circuit courts may effectively review the entire case de novo, since the
clearly erroneous rule does not apply to questions of law.80 Commentators
and some courts suggest that such a finding is really a mixed question of
law and fact, 81 but this has been of little help in harmonizing the widely
divergent approaches presently used in the circuit courts.
II. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES
A. The "Clearly Erroneous" Approach
Several circuits steadfastly hold that a finding of likelihood of confusion
under the Lanham Act is strictly a question of fact and must not be dis-
turbed unless clearly erroneous. 82 The First Circuit recently adopted this
approach in Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp .83 The plaintiff in Keebler
alleged trademark infringement and unfair competition. The district court
found that the plaintiff's trademark was actually a generic term, 84 which is
Supp. 1063, 1072-73 (W.D. Pa. 1975), afl'd, 566 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 971 (1978). For a general discussion of the various types of claims made actionable by
the Lanham Act, see Comments, supra note 13.
77. For cases holding that likelihood of confusion is a question of fact, see Armco, Inc.
v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1982); Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA
Distribs., Inc., 687 F.2d 554, 559 (lst Cir. 1980); Sun Banks, Inc. v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1981); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091
(8th Cir. 1980); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 377 (1st Cir. 1980). For
cases holding that this issue is ultimately a question of law, see Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha
Steel Tube & Shapes, mic., 616 F.2d 440, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1979); J.B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523
F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). See generally Elby's Big Boy, Inc.
v. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 231, 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d 182, 182-83 (1982) (White, J.,
dissenting) (explaining conflict between circuits).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). For discussion of the rule see supra notes 34 & 35 and accom-
panying text.
79. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
80. See Byram v. United States, 705 F.2d 1418, 1421 (5th Cir. 1983); Vesey v. United
States, 626 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1980); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 96, at 81 (3d ed. 1976).
81. AMP Inc. v. Foy, 540 F.2d 1181, 1187 (4th Cir. 1976); J.B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte
Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); B.H.
Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts, 451 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1976); 3A R. CALLMAN,
supra note 3, at § 20.62.
82. See supra note 77.
83. 624 F.2d 366, 375 (1st Cir. 1980).
84. A generic term is one that has "come to be understood as referring to the genus of
which the particular product is a species." Id. at 374 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
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undeserving of protection.85 The district court did, however, enjoin the
defendant from using the same style of packaging because the plaintiff had
exclusively used the particular package for a period of time sufficient to
acquire a protectable interest.86 The defendant packaged its product in a
can of the same size and shape, although with a different color scheme.
The First Circuit affirmed the finding that the plaintiffs trademark was
generic and therefore unprotectable. 87 The defendant, realizing its heavy
burden under rule 52 to show that the finding of a likelihood of confusion
concerning its package was clearly erroneous, 88 argued that the standard
of rule 52 should not apply. This argument was based on the fact that the
district court's findings resulted solely from inferences drawn from the
court's own examination of the two containers, without resort to testimony
or other evidence. 89 The First Circuit held that a district court's inferences
drawn from examinations of real evidence are governed by rule 52 the
same as are findings based on testamentary and other documentary evi-
dence.90 The court recognized, however, that some circuits consider the
question of likelihood of confusion as one of law. 91 The decision to disa-
gree with these circuits may have been tempered by the fact that the court
reversed the trial court, using the rule 52 standard, and ruled that the find-
ing of confusing package similarity was clearly erroneous. 92
Since its decision in Keebler, the First Circuit has had two opportunities
to reaffirm its adherence to the clearly erroneous standard regarding Lan-
ham Act claims. In Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc.93
the First Circuit declined to hold clearly erroneous a district court's finding
that no trademark infringement had occurred, even though the products
had similar appearances and design features. 94 In Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA
Distributors, Inc.95 the court, as in Keebler, declined to engage in a de
novo review when the district court's decision that an infringement had
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)). An example of a generic term is the use
of the word "aspirin" to refer to a common analgesic sold under various names. 624 F.2d at
374.
85. 624 F.2d at 371. The Lanham Act requires cancellation of trademarks that have
become "the common descriptive name for an article or substance." 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c)
(1982). Generic terms also were not entitled to protection under the common law prior to
the Lanham Act. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (no protec-
tion for generic terms); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323 (1871) (neither a
generic name nor a name merely descriptive of an article, its ingredients, or characteristics
can be employed as a trademark).
86. 624 F.2d at 371.
87. Id. at 376.
88. See supra notes 34 & 35, 78-80 and accompanying text for discussion of the standard
under rule 52.
89. 624 F.2d at 377.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The Keebler court stated: "Even under this more generous standard of review, how-
ever, we cannot accept the district court's finding of likelihood of confusion." Id.
93. 626 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 194. Both parties manufactured woodburning stoves which resembled each
other both overall and with respect to lesser details.
95. 687 F.2d 554 (lst Cir. 1982).
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occurred was based on little more than documentary evidence regarding
similarity of the products and their packaging. 96 Instead, the court af-
firmed the district court's holding as well-supported by the evidence. 97
The Fifth Circuit has also adopted the clearly erroneous approach. Its
adherence to the standard in determining the existence of likelihood of
confusion began in 1955 in Squirrel Brand Co. v. Barnard Nut Co. 98 Both
parties in Squirrel used similar pictures of squirrels on the labels of their
competing nut products. The district court classified likelihood of confu-
sion as an issue of fact when stating its findings of fact and conclusions of
law.99 In affirming the district court's finding that no trademark infringe-
ment had occurred,l 00 Judge Cameron stated that the district court's find-
ings and conclusions must stand unless found to be clearly erroneous.' 0 ' A
long line of precedent in the Fifth Circuit follows from this decision and
the court has generally adhered to the clearly erroneous standard when
reviewing findings of likelihood of confusion. 0 2
1. Exception.- The Misapplication of Legal Principles
While the First Circuit has recently adopted the clearly erroneous ap-
proach, the Fifth Circuit has been governed by rule 52 when evaluating
likelihood of confusion findings for a substantial period of time.'0 3 On
occasion, however, the Fifth Circuit has avoided strict application of rule
52 by promulgating an exception: if the district court's finding of likeli-
hood of confusion resulted from the misapplication of controlling legal
principles, then such a finding is not protected by the clearly erroneous
standard.10 4
In Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp.'0 5 the plaintiff
alleged trademark infringement under section 32 of the Lanham Act. The
plaintiff claimed that the name of the defendant's aircraft engine repair
96. Id. at 559.
97. Id. at 559-60.
98. 224 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1955).
99. Id. at 842 n.l (finding no. 19).
100. The district court found that no likelihood of confusion existed since the plaintiff
and the defendant each displayed their names prominently on their products' packages. Id.
at 842 n.I (findings nos. 16, 17, 19).
101. Id. at 843. With respect to conclusions of law, however, this holding is questiona-
ble. The trial court's application of law to the facts is not subject to the clearly erroneous
standard on review. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 80, at 589.
102. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1980);
Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899
(1980); T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. v. International Restaurant Group, Inc., 569 F.2d 895, 899 (5th
Cir. 1978); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in America. 481 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1973);
Sun-maid Raisin Growers v. Sunaid Food Prods., Inc., 356 F.2d 467, 468 (5th Cir. 1966);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 161, 168 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 894 (1957).
103. See supra notes 83 & 98 and accompanying text.
104. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 703
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified
Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 384 (5th Cir. 1977); Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental
Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir. 1967).
105. 375 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1967).
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business infringed on the plaintiffs trademark for its aircraft manufactur-
ing business. 0 6 The district court dismissed the claim, holding that the
absence of direct competition between the parties and the fact that the
plaintiff was attempting to protect a trademark that included a geographi-
cal adjective compelled denial of relief. 10 7 On appeal the Fifth Circuit
reversed and stated that the likelihood of confusion between the trade-
marks, and not the existence of competition between their owners, is the
test to be applied to determine trademark infringement. 108
In Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 109 how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court had misapplied governing
legal standards,"10 even though the court had applied the likelihood of
confusion test. "'1 Upon review of the district court's interpretation of vari-
ous factors, which had led to a finding that sufficient likelihood of confu-
sion existed to constitute unfair competition, the court posited that a
determination of likelihood of confusion requires two levels of fact find-
ing.112 First, the court must make primary findings or digits.113 Second,
based on these digits the court must find whether a likelihood of confusion
in fact exists. 114 The court held, however, that although the district court
had applied the proper analysis, 15 it had improperly weighed certain dig-
its in arriving at its finding of likelihood of confusion. 16 The circuit court
believed this to be a proper application of the "misapplication of legal
standards" exception and engaged in a de novo review of the evidence. 117
While the Continental court had merely applied the exception because the
district court had failed to consider likelihood of confusion at all, the Ken-
tucky Fried Chicken court used the exception to allow review of evidence
that led to a finding of likelihood of confusion. In the second instance, the
district court arguably applied the proper legal standards; the district court
simply weighed the evidence in a different fashion, finding certain factors
more persuasive than the appellate court would have found them. 1 8
106. The plaintiff owned at least 20 trademarks, including the words "Continental Avia-
tion." Id. at 858.
107. Id. at 859-60.
108. Id. at 861.
109. 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977).
110. Id. at 385.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 384.
113. Id. at 382. The court defined primary findings of fact as "digits" in a professed
attempt to clarify analysis of the likelihood of confusion issue.
114. Id. at 385.
115. The Fifth Circuit stated approvingly: "The [district] court's statement of the law and
its analytical technique were impeccable." Id. at 384.
116. Id. at 384-85.
117. Id.
118. The impact of this decision is perhaps lessened by the fact that the Fifth Circuit
agreed that the finding of unfair competition should stand after completing its own review of
the evidence. Id. at 386. There seems to be no reason, however, why the court could not
simply have stated that the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous, which
would have allowed the court to engage in the same de novo review of the evidence. Noth-
ing in rule 52 necessitates reversal of the district court's decision simply because its findings
of fact were clearly erroneous. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
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Possibly anticipating a loosening of the Fifth Circuit's adherence to rule
52 in Lanham Act cases, the appellee in Sun Banks v. Sun Federal Savings
& Loan1 9 urged the Fifth Circuit to adopt a middle ground between the
rule 52 standard and de novo review of the evidence. The Fifth Circuit
rejected this contention, minimizing the analysis used in Kentucky Fried
Chicketi12° Curiously, however, the court then proceeded to review the
entirety of the evidence. 12' Although noting that the district court decision
was partially based on its interpretation of witness credibility, the Fifth
Circuit still reversed the lower court.' 22 Judge O'Kelley's dissenting opin-
ion lamented that the majority had simply substituted its interpretation of
the facts for that of the trial court, which violated the permissible scope of
appellate review.' 23
The Fifth Circuit recently applied the misapplication exception to the
clearly erroneous standard in Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchas-
ing Groups.'24 The plaintiff in Chevron brought an action for trade dress
infringement 125 under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The plaintiff's
claim alleged that the defendant's product packaging constituted a false
designation of origin and a false description or representation. 26 The dis-
trict court denied injunctive relief after finding the plaintiff's proof insuffi-
cient to establish that its trademark had acquired a secondary meaning or
that the defendant's trade dress variations were likely to cause confu-
sion. 127 The Fifth Circuit ruled on appeal that the central issue in a trade
dress infringement suit under section 43(a) is whether a likelihood of con-
fusion exists between the products, and not whether the plaintiffs trade
119. 651 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1981).
120. id. at 314. The court stated: "Our comment in Kentucky Fried Chicken . . . that
'when a district court labors under a misapprehension concerning the governing legal norms,
the "clearly erroneous" standard no longer circumscribes appellate review,' may not be
taken as an erosion of the standard of review applicable to a finding of likelihood of confu-
sion." 1d.
121. Id. at 315-19.
122. Id. at 319.
123. Id. at 319-20. Judge O'Kelley's dissent stated:
The evidence supports the trial court's findings and conclusions. A reading of
the majority opinion can lead to but one conclusion. That is that factually, not
legally, this court finds that the appellant's name is not likely to be confused
with the appellee's name and registered service mark. As a matter of law that
conclusion cannot be reached.
Id. at 320.
124. 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1981).
125. A manufacturer will be liable for trade dress infringement if he packages his prod-
uct in a manner that is confusingly similar to that of another. In this case such packaging
constitutes a false representation of the product in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Id. at 700. The court rejected the notion that confusing trade dress may constitute a false
designation of origin under § 43(a), but recognized that other courts have differed. Id. n.5.
For a general discussion of the nature of a trade dress infringement suit brought under
§ 43(a), see Note, supra note 1I.
126. The plaintiff, a lawn and garden product manufacturer, claimed that the defendant
had simply copied the plaintiffs packages when marketing its own garden products, hoping,
presumably, to trade on the plaintiffs good will.
127. 659 F.2d at 696.
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dress has acquired secondary meaning. 128 The court ruled, therefore, that
the clearly erroneous standard did not apply to the appellate court's review
of the evidence, even when no likelihood of confusion is found, since the
trial court did not "apply governing legal standards in making its find-
ings." 129 The circuit court reversed the district court without ruling that its
finding was clearly erroneous. 130
The court's reasoning in Chevron, however, ignored the fact that the dis-
trict court found that neither secondary meaning nor likelihood of confu-
sion existed.'13 The Fifth Circuit apparently felt that an unnecessary
finding of fact on the part of the district court gave it carte blanche to
review the other finding de novo without reference to rule 52. Clearly such
an analysis by the appellate court circumvents, at least to some extent, the
Fifth Circuit's usual application of rule 52 to a district court's findings of
fact. Although the Fifth Circuit apparently continues to manifest an intent
to treat the finding of likelihood of confusion as one of fact, 132 the tenuous
reasoning in Lanham Act cases promulgating this exception to rule 52 ren-
ders the future of the scope of review unclear in the Fifth Circuit.
2. The "Similarity of Marks" Exception
The Second Circuit currently agrees with the First and Fifth Circuits
that the issue of likelihood of confusion is one of fact and therefore gov-
erned by rule 52.133 Nonetheless, this circuit has also grafted an exception
onto the rule. To the extent that a district court's finding concerning likeli-
hood of confusion depends on a comparison of the trademarks themselves,
the Second Circuit will review the finding de novo, reasoning that the ap-
pellate court is in as good a position to determine likelihood of confusion
as the trial court under these circumstances. 34 The exception apparently
stems from Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow- Warren, Ltd.,135 which was de-
cided prior to passage of the Lanham Act. 136 The rule stated in Eastern
Wine allows de novo review only if the trial court's decision was based
solely on a comparison of the trademarks themselves. 137 The Second Cir-
cuit, however, has broadened the rule so that the appellate court considers
the extent that the district court's decision was based upon comparison of
128. Id. at 702-03.
129. Id. at 703.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 702. The opinion even states that the district court's decision was based on
those two findings. 1d.
132. See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir.
1982); Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d
1079, 1082 (5th Cir. 1982).
133. See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982);
American Int'l Group, Inc. v. London Am. Int'l Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981).
134. Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1130 (2d Cir. 1982);
McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1133 (2d Cir. 1979); Miss Universe,
Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 1969).
135. 137 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1943).
136. The Lanham Act was passed in 1946; Eastern Wine was decided in 1943.
137. 137 F.2d at 960.
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the similarity of the products or trademarks. The extent of de novo review
of the similarities theoretically is limited to the weight given to the com-
parison by the district court in making its ultimate finding of a likelihood
of confusion.
In McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc.138 a manufacturer of golf
jackets sued a seller of women's coats, alleging trademark infringement
and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, as well as common
law unfair competition. The defendant sold a variety of women's coats,
ranging in price from $100 to $900, under the unregistered trademark
"Drizzle." The plaintiff owned the registered trademark "Drizzler," which
was used for selling golf jackets priced from $25 to $50. The district court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that insufficient potential for con-
fusion existed.139 The Second Circuit asserted its right to consider de novo
the similarity of the trademarks in question. 40 After reviewing the simi-
larity of the marks, the court approved the finding of the district court that
insufficient potential existed for confusion based on similarity alone.' 4'
The appellate review of similarity had not been restricted to the marks
themselves, but also included the manner in which they were advertised. 142
In Spring Mills, Inc. v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd.143 the importer of a
suede-like fabric selling under the registered trademark "Ultrasuede" sued
a women's garment manufacturer, which marketed a fabric called "Ultra-
cashmere." The importer alleged trademark infringement and false
designation of origin under the Lanham Act, arguing that consumers
would be confused as to the origin of "Ultracashmere." In reviewing the
district court's finding concerning the similarity of the marks, the Second
Circuit again asserted its right to consider such similarity de novo.'44 The
court stated that an inquiry into the similarity of the marks should extend
also into the setting in which the marks were used. 145 Using this new
rubric, the court proceeded to consider evidence concerning the way the
tags containing the trademarks in question were presented to prospective
purchasers. 46 Based on its own evaluation of this evidence, the court dis-
agreed with the trial judge's finding that the marks differed significantly. 147
The court nonetheless remained within the conventional strictures of rule
52 in overruling, as clearly erroneous, the trial court's other findings that
the defendant did not act in bad faith in adopting its trademark and that
no likelihood of confusion existed. 48
The Second Circuit again reviewed de novo the similarity of marks in
138, 599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979).
139. Id. at 1133-34.
140. Id. at 1133.
141. Id. at 1133-34.
142. Id. at 1134-35.
143. 689 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1982).
144. Id. at 1130.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1132-33.
148. Id. at 1136.
[Vol. 38
COMMENTS
Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc. 14 9 The plaintiff in
Playboy alleged the same violations of the Lanham Act as did the plaintiff
in McGregor-Doniger.150 The dispute in Playboy arose out of an Italian
publisher's decision to publish an American version of its sex-oriented
magazine under the title "Playmen." Playboy Enterprises brought suit
under sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act to protect its registered
trademark "Playboy." After a hearing on Playboy's motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction, the defendant offered to change the title of the American
version of its magazine to "Adelina," with the subtitle "America's edition
of Italy's Playmen." The district court eventually granted a permanent
injunction against the use of the term "Playmen" in either the title or sub-
title of its American edition, reasoning that the defendant's purpose in
adopting the Playmen trademark was to trade on Playboy's popularity.' 5'
After extensively reviewing the evidence, the Second Circuit used the
yardstick of rule 52 broadly and stated that none of the findings of the
district court were clearly erroneous. 152
The Second Circuit opinions all purport, in the abstract, to recognize
that likelihood of confusion is a question of fact. 153 The similarity of
marks exception, which allows for de novo review, has apparently been
extended to include advertising and other methods of presenting the marks
by the recent decisions in Spring Mills and McGregor-Doniger. Whether
this evinces an insidious erosion of the Second Circuit's adherence to rule
52 in determining likelihood of confusion remains to be seen.
B. Ninth Circuit.- The Two-Tiered Test
The Ninth Circuit's position on the issue of whether likelihood of confu-
sion is a question of law or fact is not the polar opposite of other circuits,
but allows a far broader scope of review in Lanham Act cases. In Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. 1 5 4 a whiskey distributor sued a
brewer and a grocer for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.
The distributor owned the trademark "Black & White," which it used on
the label of its Scotch whiskey. The defendant brewer sold a cheap quality
beer under the label "Black & White" to the defendant grocer. The district
court denied injunctive relief, finding that the lack of real competition be-
tween the plaintiffs Scotch whiskey and the defendant's beer rendered
confusion unlikely. 155 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that the ques-
149. 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982).
150. The plaintiff alleged trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair
competition, as well as a state law claim.
151. The district court first granted a preliminary injunction against the use of
"Playmen" in the title of the magazine. 486 F. Supp. 414, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). After a trial
on the merits, the court granted a permanent injunction against the use of "Playmen" in
either the title or the subtitle. 687 F.2d at 565.
152. 687 F.2d at 566.
153. Playboy, 687 F.2d at 566; American Int'l Group, Inc. v. London Am. Int'l Corp.,
664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981); McGregor-Doniger, 599 F.2d at 1146.
154. 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1963).
155. 196 F. Supp. 401, 403 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
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tion of likelihood of confusion was ultimately for the appellate court to
answer. 56 The court, however, then assumed that the trial court's deter-
mination that no likelihood of confusion existed was a finding of fact and
reversed the finding as clearly erroneous.' 57 Whether the court truly in-
tended to stray from the clearly erroneous standard in reviewing likelihood
of confusion is unclear; yet this decision formed the basis for a fairly uni-
form line of precedent holding that likelihood of confusion is ultimately a
question of law.158
A recent Ninth Circuit case presented as its central issue determination
of the appropriate standard of review concerning likelihood of confusion.
In Alpha Industries, Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc. 159 the plaintiff
sued for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and false designation
of origin under the Lanham Act. The district court ruled that no likeli-
hood of confusion between the trademarks was shown. 160 The appellant
argued to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the finding of an ab-
sence of likelihood of confusion was really a legal conclusion and thus
independently reviewable by the appellate court. The appellee maintained
that such a finding was a finding of fact and therefore subject to the clearly
erroneous standard of rule 52. The court held that a two-level test is the
proper standard.' 6' Under the two-level test any disputed findings of fact
that underlie the finding of likelihood of confusion are reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard, 62 and the ultimate determination of likeli-
hood of confusion is a legal conclusion subject to independent review by
the appellate court. 163 The court then engaged in a structured, fact-by-fact
analysis of each of the underlying factors and determined each finding
concerning them not clearly erroneous. 164 Since none of the findings nec-
essary to show likelihood of confusion were made by the district court, the
156. 314 F.2d at 152. The Fleischmann court cited Sleeper Lounge Co. v. Bell Mfg. Co.,
253 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1958). In Sleeper the court held that since the trial court's deter-
mination resulted primarily from examining the trademarks themselves, both courts were
equally able to judge likelihood of confusion.
157. 314 F.2d at 155.
158. See, e.g., Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443-
44 (9th Cir. 1980) (two-step test is used with ultimate question of likelihood of confusion
reviewed as a legal question); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.
1979) (recognizing that prior irreconcilable case law had been reconciled in a recent case so
that where no facts were disputed likelihood of confusion was reviewable as a legal conclu-
sion). But see J.B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir.
1975) (even where underlying facts are disputed, if they are clearly erroneous, appellate
court may reverse), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
159. 616 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see supra text
accompanying notes 55-57.
160. 616 F.2d at 442.
161. Id. at 443.
162. Id. at 443-44. The court referred to these underlying factors as "foundational
facts." 1d. The underlying factors involved in Alpha were the following: (1) the similarity
of the marks; (2) evidence of actual confusion; (3) the relationship between appellant's and
appellee's goods and channels of trade; (4) the strength of the appellant's mark; and (5) ap-
pellee's intent in adopting its mark. Id. at 444.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 444-46.
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circuit court easily concluded that the district court's legal conclusions
were correct.165 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, has taken a structured, well-
defined approach to the likelihood of confusion issue. The court again
used this approach in Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho. 166 In Golden Door the
court determined that none of the underlying facts found by the trial court
were clearly erroneous and consequently affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion. 167 The Ninth Circuit has not faced a situation in which it approves
the district court's underlying findings of fact but reverses the decision
based on an opposing legal conclusion as to likelihood of confusion. Until
this transpires the Ninth Circuit approach, although potentially increasing
the power of the appellate court,' 68 will produce no different results than
use of the clearly erroneous standard.
C. Miscellaneous Approaches
A standard similar to the Ninth Circuit's two-step test for appellate re-
view has recently been promulgated in the Third Circuit. In Scott Paper
Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc. 169 the Third Circuit reversed a district
court's finding that sufficient likelihood of confusion existed to warrant
relief for trademark infringement. 70 The court recognized the confines of
rule 52 with respect to findings of fact, but emphasized that neither infer-
ences drawn from basic facts nor findings based primarily on documentary
evidence are subject to rule 52.171 By implication, therefore, the court sug-
gested that likelihood of confusion is not subject to rule 52 on appeal. 72
Although the court made no explicit statement to this effect, its brief opin-
ion overturning the trial court's exhaustive analysis of the evidence leads
quickly to the conclusion that the appellate court presupposed that it was
165. Id. at 446.
166. 646 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1980). In Golden Door plaintiff operated a health and beauty
spa under the registered trademark Golden Door. Hairstyling was one of the services pro-
vided at the spa. The defendant operated two hair styling salons, one under the name
"Golden Door Coiffeur," and the other under the name "Golden Door for Hair." The salons
were approximately 500 miles from the plaintiffs spa.
167. Id. at 351. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals independently found that the de-
fendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark was likely to cause confusion, based on the trial
court's findings concerning the underlying facts. Id. The effect of such an independent
finding did not intrude on the trial court's findings at all, however, since the circuit court
merely affirmed the lower court's decision.
168. Clearly, under the rubric used in both 4lpha Industries and Golden Door, the Ninth
Circuit could affirm every finding of "foundational fact" made by the district court and yet
reverse upon reaching a different conclusion concerning likelihood of confusion after weigh-
ing these facts.
169. 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978).
170. Id. at 1230.
171. Id. at 1229 n.3. The court cited In re Multidistrict Litigation Involving Frost Pat-
ent, 540 F.2d 601, 603 (3d Cir. 1976) (appellate court was in as good a position as trial court
to determine whether patent fraud had occurred, since finding was based on documentary
evidence); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir.) (in copyright
infringement case that involved no question of witness credibility, appellate court could de-
termine for itself whether infringement had occurred), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975).
172. 589 F.2d at 1229 n.3.
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reviewing a question of law.' 73
The Fourth Circuit is currently laboring under inconsistent precedent
with respect to the likelihood of confusion issue. InAMP Inc. v. Foy 174 the
plaintiff, AMP Incorporated, sued the defendant, Amp Electric Company,
for trademark infringement. The plaintiff manufactured electrical compo-
nent parts, which it sold mainly to power companies, discount houses, and
manufacturers of electrical appliances. The defendant operated an electri-
cal contracting company and engaged in wiring houses and apartments
and repairing home appliances. The district court denied relief, finding
that the word "amp" is used in contexts other than the electrical trade and
that the plaintiff and defendant were not competitors.175 The defendant's
use of the word "amp" was, therefore, not likely to confuse the plaintiffs
customers.176 The Fourth Circuit undertook a complete de novo review of
the evidence 77 and ultimately held that the trial court improperly weighed
the evidence, which mandated a reversal. 178 The court noted that deci-
sions in other circuits hold that likelihood of confusion is an inference to
be drawn from facts, and, therefore, the court might not be bound by rule
52 when reviewing a district court's finding of likelihood of confusion. 179
The lack of clarity of this statement combined with the later Fourth Circuit
decision in Marcon, Ltd v. Helena Rubenstein, Inc.' 80 arguably minimizes
the significance of this dictum. In Marcon the Fourth Circuit approved a
district court's characterization of the issue of likelihood of confusion in a
trademark infringement case as a question of fact. 8 ' The Fourth Circuit
explicitly held that such a finding of fact could only be overturned if
clearly erroneous. 8 2
173. The trial judge's extensive 30-page opinion culminated in a specific finding that the
defendant's actions created a likelihood of confusion. 439 F. Supp. 1022, 1052 (D. Del.
1977). The Third Circuit focused more on the question of whether the plaintiffs trademark
had acquired a secondary meaning in the minds of customers such that it would be pro-
tectible. 589 F.2d at 1228. This consequently down-played the court's decision to overturn
the finding of a likelihood of confusion.
174. 540 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1976).
175. 379 F. Supp. 105, 111 (W.D.N.C. 1974). As evidence of the fact that the word
"amp" is used in contexts outside the electrical trade, and is "a well recognized feature of the
English language," id. at 108, Judge McMillan relied upon the following limerick by Wil-
liam S. BaringGould:
A lady removing her scanties
Heard them crackle electrical chanties;
Said her husband, "My dear,
I very much fear •
You suffer from amps in your panties."
Id.
176. Id. at I11.
177. 540 F.2d at 1184-87.
178. Id. at 1187.
179. Id. The fact that the Fourth Circuit simply undertook a reweighing of the evidence
without holding the trial court's findings clearly erroneous seriously jeopardizes the prece-
dential value of this decision, given the Supreme Court's recent holding in Inwood Labs.,
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982); see infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
180. 694 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1982).
181. Id. at 955.
182. 1d. at 956.
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The Sixth Circuit has recently placed itself in the two-level test category
by explicitly adopting, without discussion, the Ninth Circuit approach to
the question of likelihood of confusion.'8 3 The Seventh Circuit, on the
other hand, has confirmed its adherence to the clearly erroneous standard
when reviewing this issue.' 8 4 The Seventh Circuit, however, recognizes
the Second Circuit's "similarity of marks" exception, which allows the cir-
cuit court to use a broader standard of review when the district court's
decisions in trademark infringement cases are primarily predicated on in-
terpretation of documentary evidence.
85
The Eighth Circuit also holds that likelihood of confusion is strictly an
issue of fact. 186 No recognized exceptions to the rule, however, are appar-
ent in existing Eighth Circuit precedent. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
holds that a finding of likelihood of confusion is a question of fact, which
is irreversible unless found to be clearly erroneous. 87 The remaining cir-
cuits have not rendered an opinion on the issue.
III. SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE
In Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc. 88 a restaurant owner
licensed to use a trademark in Ohio brought suit for infringement. 8 9 The
defendants held a license to use the same trademark in adjoining West
Virginia, but the plaintiff contended that television advertising conducted
by the defendant reached both states, creating a false impression that the
plaintiff's products were available at restaurants operated by the defend-
ant, but not under a trademark, in Ohio. 190 The district court granted a
preliminary injunction against the advertising under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, based on a finding that the advertising created a likelihood
183. Frisch's Restaurants v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 651 (6th Cir.), cer. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982). The Sixth Circuit gave little rationale for
adopting the test, but stated only that "The Ninth Circuit has developed a two-level test for
reviewing lower court findings of likelihood of confusion." Id. The Sixth Circuit merely
stated that it agreed with the Ninth Circuit and proceeded to apply the two-level test to the
case at bar. Id. For more discussion of Elby, see infra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
184. Henri's Food Prods. Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1983).
185. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 273 (7th Cir.
1976); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 (7th Cir.), cer. denied,
429 U.S. 830 (1976).
186. John Deere & Co. v. Payless Cashways, Inc., 681 F.2d 520, 524 (8th Cir. 1982);
Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir.
1980); Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980).
187. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 973 (11th Cir. 1983);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 832 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
All Fifth Circuit decisions made prior to Sept. 30, 1981, are binding on the Eleventh Circuit.
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit
clearly views likelihood of confusion as an issue of fact. See supra notes 98-102 and accom-
panying text.
188. 514 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Ohio 1981), ajfdinpart and rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 642 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982).
189. The plaintiff was licensed to use the "Big Boy" trademark in connection with adver-
tising and promotion of its 80 restaurants in Ohio.
190. 514 F. Supp. at 707-08.
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of confusion.' 91 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's
two-level test; the circuit court reviewed the foundational facts found by
the district court under the clearly erroneous standard, 92 but reviewed de
novo the conclusion of likelihood of confusion. 193 The court noted that
the facts were not in dispute and based its decision wholly on its de novo
review of the district court's finding of likelihood of confusion. 194 The ap-
pellate court held that the injunction that had been issued was not broad
enough, 95 and the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to review the case. Although certiorari was denied, Justice
White dissented and argued that the conflict over the standard of review
deserved resolution. 196
Although the Supreme Court did not directly act to resolve this di-
lemma, the Court's recent decision in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc. 197 provides some guidance. In Ives a drug manufac-
turer brought suit after discovering that some pharmacists dispensed ge-
neric substitutes for the manufacturer's drug in bottles that were labeled
with the manufacturer's trademark. The district court denied preliminary
injunctive relief,198 and the Second Circuit affirmed. 199 The appellate
court suggested that the manufacturers of the generic drugs would be lia-
ble if they continued to sell drugs to pharmacists who they knew were
infringing on the plaintiffs trademark, or if they impliedly suggested
through their actions that the pharmacists should mislabel the drugs. 200
After a trial on the merits, the district court denied any relief to the plain-
tiff, finding that no contributory infringement had occurred. 20 1 The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed after evaluating the evidence de novo without
holding that the district court's findings were clearly erroneous. 20 2 The
Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit's failure to abide by the
191. Id. at 712.
192. 670 F.2d at 648. Factors used in determining likelihood of confusion by the Sixth
Circuit included the following: (1) strength of the plaintiffs mark; (2) relatedness of the
goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels
used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and
(8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. Id.
193. Id. at 651.
194. Id. The Elby court stated:
Even without evidence of actual consumer confusion, examination of the
other factors which are not in dispute, i.e., intent, likely degree of purchaser
care, and the unavoidable confusion resulting from the use of identical trade-
marks in similar marketing channels, inexorably leads to the "legal conclu-
sion" that confusion is just as likely to result from Elby's newspaper
advertisements as from their television advertisements.
Id.
195. Id. at 652. The Sixth Circuit extended the injunction to include newspaper
advertisement.
196. 103 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
197. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
198. Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 455 F. Supp. 939, 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). An
injunction was granted against a different defendant.
199. 601 F.2d 631, 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
200. Id. at 636.
201. 488 F. Supp. 394, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
202. 638 F.2d 538, 543-45 (2d Cir. 1981).
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clearly erroneous standard in rule 52 was reversible error. 20 3
The application of this decision to the likelihood of confusion issue is
limited because the courts never determined whether likelihood of confu-
sion existed. The Supreme Court accepted the conclusion that a trade-
mark infringement had occurred because of the proven instances of
mislabeling.20 4 The court, therefore, did not discuss the likelihood of con-
fusion issue, upon which the usual claim for trademark infringement
under the Lanham Act is predicated. Rather, the issues at trial involved
whether the imitation of the plaintiffs drug and the distribution of a cata-
logue revealing its similar appearance to the defendant's generic product
contributed to a trademark infringement by the pharmacists. 20 5
The significance of the decision with respect to the standard of review
lies in the Supreme Court's commitment to vigilant enforcement of rule 52.
The Ives Court stated:
By rejecting the District Court's findings simply because it would have
given more weight to evidence of mislabeling than did the trial court,
the Court of Appeals clearly erred. Determining the weight and cred-
ibility of the evidence is the special province of the trier of fact. Be-
cause the trial court's findings concerning the significance of the
instances of mislabeling were not clearly erroneous, they should not
have been disturbed.20 6
This edict potentially undermines the Ninth Circuit's use of the two-step
test to determine likelihood of confusion, because the Ninth Circuit abides
by rule 52 only with respect to the trial court's determination of founda-
tional facts. 207 District courts must weigh these facts according to the de-
gree they militate toward or against a finding of likelihood of confusion,
but the Ninth Circuit reviews this balancing process de novo. The
Supreme Court's decision in Ives suggests that de novo review may be an
improvident intrusion into the province of the factfinder.
In Ires the Supreme Court reiterated its earlier definition of the clearly
erroneous standard given in United States v. United States Gypsum Co 2o8
The Court in United States Gypsum held that an appellate court may deter-
mine a trial court's findings clearly erroneous only when "the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
203. 456 U.S. at 856.
204. Id. at 854. The court stated "It is undisputed that those pharmacists who mislabeled
generic drugs with Ives registered trademark violated § 32." Id. (footnote omitted).
205. A finding of likelihood of confusion was not required in this situation. The court
stated the test for contributory infringement as follows:
[1lf a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the
deceit.
Id. at 854 (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 856.
207. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
208. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
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that a mistake has been committed. ' 20 9 The Supreme Court also stated
that inferences drawn from documents or undisputed facts are circum-
scribed on appeal by rule 52.210 Insofar as the Second Circuit's similarity
of marks exception to the clearly erroneous standard 2l' conflicts with the
United States Gypsum holding, future rejection of this exception by the
Supreme Court seems likely.
In Ives the Court did not, however, specifically reaffirm the statement in
United States Gypsum concerning inferences drawn from documentary ev-
idence.212 Federal courts display a general disagreement concerning the
scope of appellate review of inferences drawn from facts by the trial
court. 213 The Supreme Court previously discussed the problem of catego-
rizing a finding as one of law or fact in Baumgartner v. United States.2 14 In
Baumgartner the United States attempted to revoke the citizenship of a
naturalized citizen.215 The district court held that citizenship should be
revoked, 216 and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 217 The Supreme Court, while
professing respect for the lower court's findings, held that the proof did not
merit denaturalization. 21I The court recognized a distinction between sub-
sidiary facts and ultimate facts. 219 The characterization of a trial court's
findings as one of ultimate fact, the Court stated, makes permissible a
broader scope of review than that exercised concerning subsidiary facts.220
The Court concluded that it was entitled to review the finding of the dis-
trict court that sufficiently clear evidence existed to warrant cancellation of
a naturalization certificate. 22' This analytical framework closely parallels
the Ninth Circuit's two-level test for reviewing findings of likelihood of
confusion in Lanham Act claims.222 Apparently, given the similarity, dis-
approval of the Ninth Circuit test in claims brought under the Lanham Act
209. Id. at 395.
210. Id. at 394.
211. The Second Circuit does not abide by rule 52 in determining likelihood of confu-
sion when the district court's decision was based on the similarity of the trademarks them-
selves. See supra notes 133-53 and accompanying text.
212. No discussion of inferences drawn from facts occurred in Ives.
213. See 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 33, § 23.22; C. WRIGHT, supra note 80, § 96.
214. 322 US. 665 (1944).
215. The citizen allegedly was a Nazi sympathizer during World War I1 while residing in
the United States.
216. 47 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
217. 138 F.2d 29, 35 (8th Cir. 1943).
218. 322 U.S. at 670. The Court stated:
That the concurrent findings of two lower courts are persuasive proof in sup-
port of their judgments is a rule of wisdom in judicial administration. In reaf-
firming its importance we mean to pay more than lip service. But the rule
does not relieve us of the task of examining the foundation for findings in a
particular case.
Id.
219. Id. at 671.
220. Id. at 670-71.
221. Id. at 671.
222. The Supreme Court in Baumgartner discussed ultimate facts versus subsidiary facts.
The Ninth Circuit characterizes these subsidiary facts as foundational facts. See Alpha In-
dus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443-44 (9th Cir. 1980); supra
notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
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would require disavowal of the reasoning in Baumgartner.223
A. An Analogy to Securities Decisions
One way to resolve the dilemma regarding appellate review of likeli-
hood of confusion would be to abandon efforts to categorize this issue as
one of fact or of law, and instead categorize it as a mixed question of law
and fact. The Supreme Court analyzed the process of reviewing a some-
what analogous mixed law and fact question in the securities regulation
area in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 224 In Northway a minority
shareholder sued two companies that had recently merged, claiming that
their joint proxy statements issued to solicit approval of the merger con-
tained materially misleading omissions in violation of section 14(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934225 and rules 14a-3 and 14a-9 promulgated
under that Act. 226 The shareholder moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that certain omissions from the proxy statements were material as
a matter of law. The district court granted instead the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, 227 but the court of appeals reversed and granted
partial summary judgment for the shareholder. 228
The Supreme Court characterized the materiality of the misrepresenta-
tions as a mixed question of law and fact. 229 The Court stated that consid-
eration of the underlying facts is only part of the analysis necessary to
determine whether the omissions are material, and that final determination
of materiality requires a court to assess the inferences a reasonable share-
holder would draw from the underlying facts.230 The Court also stated
that these assessments are properly left to the trier of fact.23' In reversing
the grant of summary judgment to the shareholder, the Court held that
none of the omissions from the proxy statements were material as a matter
of law.232
The Supreme Court recognized that two levels of findings are required
to determine the presence of materiality, or lack thereof, just as the Ninth
Circuit has recognized that a two-tier analysis is necessary to determine the
existence of likelihood of confusion in actions brought under the Lanham
Act.2 3 3 The Supreme Court held, however, that the assessment of infer-
ences drawn from the underlying facts regarding the issue of materiality is
223. The Supreme Court noted in Baumgartner, however, that flexibility in characteriz-
ing a finding as one of law or of fact is particularly applicable to cases involving broad social
judgments. 322 U.S. at 671. Since the Lanham Act case may not possess this status given its
commercialized context, Baumgartner can perhaps be read as not necessarily endorsing the
Ninth Circuit's logic.
224. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
226. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14a-9 (1983).
227. 361 F. Supp. 108, 120 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
228. 512 F.2d 324, 342 (7th Cir. 1975).
229. 426 U.S. at 450.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 463-64.
233. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
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clearly in the trial court's domain. 234 The holding in Northway, by anal-
ogy, suggests that if the issue of likelihood of confusion may properly be
classified as a mixed question of law and fact, then the Supreme Court
would still expect circuit courts to abide by rule 52 and reverse only when
willing to label the lower court's findings as clearly erroneous.
IV. THE PATENT LAW ANALOGY OF OBVIOUSNESS
One commentator has noted that determination of whether a patent is
valid bears analytical resemblance to determination of whether trademark
infringement has occurred. 235 An invention may not be protected by a
patent if the invention is obvious.236 A court's finding as to whether an
invention is obvious has traditionally been characterized as a question of
law.237 Circuit courts, therefore, are not bound by rule 52 when reviewing
the evidence leading to such a finding. Recent decisions, however, illus-
trate that the circuits are no longer in harmony on this issue.
The Fifth Circuit recently held that while the ultimate question of obvi-
ousness is one of law, certain findings of fact underly this determination. 238
This type of analysis is similar to the two-level test used by the Ninth Cir-
cuit to determine likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement
cases, 239 but the Fifth Circuit does not subscribe to the two-level test when
reviewing findings of likelihood of confusion.240 Both the First and Tenth
Circuits have recently characterized the issue of obviousness as a question
of fact.241 The Tenth Circuit agrees that the ultimate validity of a patent is
a question of law, but considers obviousness as one of the underlying fac-
tual determinations that is necessary to determine the validity of the pat-
ent.242 Since the ultimate test of patent validity is obviousness,243 however,
234. 426 U.S. at 450.
235. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 33, § 23.22.
236. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) provides that an invention is not eligible for patent:
[I]f the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains.
237. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 33, § 23.22.
238. Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 672 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1982).
239. See Alpha Indus. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443 (9th Cir.
1980).
240. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 659 F.2d 695, 703 (5th
Cir. 1981); supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (Fifth Circuit adheres to "clearly erro-
neous" standard).
241. Carter Wallace, Inc. v. Gillette Co., 675 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1981); Central Soya
Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel Co., 645 F.2d 847, 850 (10th Cir. 1981); Forbro Design Corp. v.
Raytheon Co., 532 F.2d 758, 763 (ist Cir. 1976). In Forbro the First Circuit stated:
[O]bviousness as an ultimate question cannot meaningfully be separated from
those factual determinations which are peculiarly within the trial court's prov-
ince, such as the credibility of the experts. The district court's supported find-
ings on obviousness will therefore normally stand unless manifesting a
misconception of the correct legal standard.
532 F.2d at 763.
242. Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 645 F.2d 847, 850 (10th Cir. 1981).
243. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976); see Central Soya Co. v. Geo A. Hormel & Co., 645 F.2d 847,
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the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit effectively means that obviousness is
reviewable on appeal as a conclusion of law. The remaining circuits gen-
erally consider the question of obviousness a legal question.244
A finding of obviousness in patent cases parallels a finding of likelihood
of confusion in trademark infringement cases because both require infer-
ences to be drawn by a court based on the consideration of various fac-
tors.245 Because disagreement exists among the circuits concerning the
treatment of obviousness in patent cases, an analogy to this doctrine can
no longer be confidently used to buttress an argument for considering like-
lihood of confusion as either a question of fact or a conclusion of law.
V. RULES 52 AND 56: APPLICATION TO THE MORASS
The rigid classification of likelihood of confusion as a question of fact
by some circuits has significant implications. First, since likelihood of con-
fusion is the gravamen of an action brought under the Lanham Act for
either trademark infringement or unfair competition, 246 an appellate court
can reverse a decision only if the trial court's finding is determined to be
clearly erroneous. 247 Although the appellate courts are skilled in applying
the law to the facts, 2 4 8 little, if any, occasion to use this skill arises under
Lanham Act claims in circuits that classify likelihood of confusion as a
question of fact. Since the ultimate test for infringement is a question of
fact, appellate discretion is rarely involved, unless the trial court simply
does not apply the standard as the determinative test.249 These circuits are
apparently cognizant of the danger to the integrity of the judicial system
engendered by the retrial of fact issues under the guise of appellate re-
850 (10th Cir. 1981) (explaining § 103). See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 17
(1966) (inquiries into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a pre-
requisite to patentability).
244. See Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1070 (5th Cir. 1982); Contico Int'l, Inc.
v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 665 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1981); Kabushiki Kai-
sha Audio-Technica v. Atlantis Sound, Inc., 629 F.2d 978, 980 (4th Cir. 1980); Sargent-
Welch Scientific Co. v. J/B Indus., Inc., 496 F. Supp. 972, 977 n.8 (N.D. Il1. 1980); Berg-
strom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 496 F. Supp. 476, 485 (D. Minn. 1980). But see
Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1322-23 (5th Cir.) (issue of
patent infringement is one of fact, but patent validity is a question of law), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1014 (1980). The court in Studiengesellschaft noted that patent cases are well-suited for
judging the trial court's evaluation of evidence according to rule 52 because the cases fre-
quently contain conflicts of expert testimony. 616 F.2d at 1323.
245. Factual inquiries involved in determining patent validity under 35 U.S.C. § 103
(1976) include the following: (I) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the perti-
nent art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). For factors used to prove
likelihood of confusion, see supra notes 162 & 192.
246. See supra text accompanying note 39.
247. See generally supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text discussing the clearly erro-
neous approach to the issue of likelihood of confusion.
248. Glassman Constr. Co. v. United States, 421 F.2d 212, 214 (4th Cir. 1970).
249. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 n.15 (1982) (court's
findings based on mistaken impression of applicable legal principles do not bind reviewing
court to rule 52).
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view.250 The Supreme Court recently stated in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc.251 that rule 52 is grounded in respect for the
"unique opportunity afforded the trial court judge to evaluate the credibil-
ity of witnesses and weigh the evidence. ' 252 Failure to apply rule 52 to
findings made solely on the basis of documentary evidence, however, does
not seem to violate the spirit of rule 52 because credibility is not an issue.
Nevertheless, one could question whether the appropriate role of the ap-
pellate court is to give the losers at trial a second chance on fact questions.
Another implication of Ives may highlight a conflict between the Ninth
Circuit's approach and rule 52. Justice White, in a concurring opinion,
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the circuit court wrongly over-
turned the district court's finding that the features upon which the plaintiff
based its infringement claim were functional and therefore not an infringe-
ment. 253 Justice White referred to the subsidiary factors used by the dis-
trict court in determining that the features were functional as findings and
clearly concluded that the ultimate finding is governed on appeal by rule
52.254 The district court's analysis to determine functionality is analogous
to the two-level test used in the Ninth Circuit to determine existence of
likelihood of confusion.255 The Ninth Circuit's characterization of the ul-
timate finding of likelihood of confusion as a question of law may, by
analogy, be jeopardized.
An even more significant consequence of the characterization of the
likelihood of confusion test as a finding of fact is demonstrated by the
application of rule 56, which concerns summary judgments. 256 Federal
courts are precluded from granting summary judgments to either party if a
250. See Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (integrity
of judicial system rests on the principle that precludes retrial of fact issues under the pre-
tense of appellate review).
251. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
252. 1d. at 855.
253. Id. at 861-62. When the objectionable features of an alleged infringer's product are
functional, the product does not constitute infringement so long as the functional features
are not patented. When the attributes complained of perform recognizable functions, soci-
ety's interest in free competition allows them to imitate features of other products with im-
punity. See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir.
1980).
Justice White noted several factors that the district court used to determine that the attrib-
utes were functional. 456 U.S. at 862.
254. Justice White concluded that "Clearly, the Court of Appeals could not reject these
findings merely because it viewed the evidence as less persuasive than did the District Court.
Rule 52(a) imposes a stricter standard." 456 U.S. at 862.
255. The Ninth Circuit analyzes various underlying factors according to the clearly erro-
neous test and then considers the ultimate question of likelihood of confusion to be a ques-
tion of law. See Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443
(9th Cir. 1980).
256. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides in part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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genuine issue of material fact exists. 257 In circuits that consider likelihood
of confusion an exclusively factual question, summary judgment could
rarely, if ever, be granted in claims brought under the Lanham Act be-
cause factual issues are inappropriate for determination by summary judg-
ment.258 A circuit court would have no available grounds on which to
issue summary judgment without admitting that the final determination of
the issue of likelihood of confusion is a question of law.259 This restriction
may not be a cause for concern, however, since the findings in an unfair
competition case involve a complex assessment of many variables, 260 and
federal courts often state that summary judgment is inappropriate when
complex issues are involved. 26'
If a court determines as a matter of law that no likelihood of confusion
exists and grants summary judgment on that basis, but professes to con-
sider likelihood of confusion a question of fact, then arguably a de facto
adoption of the Ninth Circuit's two-level test occurs. The Ninth Circuit
treats the facts underlying a determination of likelihood of confusion as
subject to rule 52 and the ultimate determination of likelihood of confu-
sion as a question of law open to redetergiination by the circuit courts.262
If likelihood of confusion is thought of as requiring a determination of
the state of mind of consumers, concern for interference with rendition of
summary judgment in those circuits that treat the issue as a question of
257. Id.
258. Eg., Keiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1980).
259. This problem was narrowly avoided in WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales Co., 709 F.2d
1084 (6th Cir. 1983). The defendant in WSM appealed from the district court's summary
judgment granted to the plaintiff. The defendant claimed summary judgment was inappro-
priate in trademark infringement cases brought under the Lanham Act. The Sixth Circuit,
relying on its recent decision in Frisch's Restaurants v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982), discussed supra notes 188-96
and accompanying text, held that summary judgment was just as appropriate in trademark
infringement cases as in any other case. 614 F.2d at 1086. The court stated that likelihood
of confusion is a question of law, which is an appropriate issue for summary judgment. 1d.
In circuits that treat likelihood of confusion as a question of fact, likelihood of confusion
may not, theoretically, be an appropriate issue for summary judgment.
See also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1975), in which the decision
turned on the materiality of the misrepresentations and omissions in the proxy statements
issued by the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's grant of sum-
mary judgment to the plaintiff, and held that none of the omissions were material as a mat-
ter of law. Id. at 450. The Court reasoned that the findings required to determine
materiality were "peculiarly ones for the trier of fact." Id. The Northway decision further
supports the notion that summary judgment may be inappropriate on the issue of likelihood
of confusion in Lanham Act cases, since resolution of this issue similarly requires initial and
ultimate findings of fact. For a thorough discussion of the Northway case, see supra text
accompanying notes 224-34.
260. See supra text accompanying note 71.
261. See, e.g., Benson v. Allphin, 544 F. Supp. 464, 470 (N.D. 111. 1982) (summary jug-
ment is particularly inappropriate in cases involving complex fact situations, disputed testi-
mony, or delicate constitutional rights); Hoover v. Holston Valley Community Hosp., 545 F.
Supp. 8, 11 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (trial judge should be slow to dispose of actions of any com-
plexity by summary judgment); Lopez v. Modisitt, 488 F. Supp. 1169, 1174 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (court must be extremely hesitant to grant summary judgment on important and com-
plex issues without adequate factual basis in record).
262. Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc., 616 F.2d 440, 443 (9th Cir.
1980); see supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
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fact may be moot. Summary judgment is usually inappropriate to resolve
disputes concerning state of mind and conflicting interpretations of per-
ceived events263 because state of mind is normally an inference drawn
from facts. 264 The very cornerstone of the inquiry in determining likeli-
hood of confusion is whether consumers are likely to exhibit a confused
state of mind concerning products because of the defendant's alleged un-
fair competition.2 65 This suggests that the state of mind exception may
prevent rendition of summary judgment on the issue of likelihood of con-
fusion irrespective of its classification as a question of law or fact.
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of whether a defendant's actions created a likelihood of
confusion between his product and that of another is generally recognized
to be the central issue in a claim brought under the Lanham Act. The role
of appellate courts in reviewing district court findings of likelihood of con-
fusion in trademark infringement and unfair competition claims brought
under the Act varies markedly from circuit to circuit. Some circuits hold
that the ultimate determination of likelihood of confusion is a question of
fact and may not be overturned unless the district court's finding is clearly
erroneous. Other circuits hold that subsidiary facts found by the trial court
leading to determination of whether or not likelihood of confusion exists
may not be overturned unless clearly erroneous, but that the ultimate
question of likelihood of confusion is a legal question reviewable de novo
by the circuit court.
The Supreme Court recently passed up an opportunity to resolve the
dispute by denying certiorari in Frisch's Restaurants v. Elby's Big BOy.266
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc.,267 however, provides some guidance, although likeli-
hood of confusion was not specifically addressed. One possible resolution
263. Schmidt v. McKay, 555 F.2d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Azalea Meats, Inc. v.
Muscat, 386 F.2d 5, 10 (5th Cir. 1967) (simply not feasible to resolve issue of due diligence
by summary judgment where state of mind is involved); Hartnett v. Schmit, 501 F. Supp.
1024, 1028 (N.D. 111. 1980) (summary judgment usually unavailable to resolve state of
mind); Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (D. Mass.) (summary
judgment should be used sparingly and with great circumspection where motive, intent, and
state of mind are involved), aftd, 636 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 821
(1981); Seven D. Enters., Ltd. v. Fonzi, 438 F. Supp. 161, 162 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (court is
especially reluctant to issue summary judgment when action involves state of mind of one of
the parties); In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 25 Bankr. 844, 854 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(summary judgment inappropriate where reliance on circumstantial evidence to prove state
of mind is involved). But see Via v. City of Richmond, 543 F. Supp. 382, 385 (E.D. Va.
1982) (in appropriate circumstances, summary judgment may be proper even though state of
mind is in issue); Berard v. General Motors Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (D. Mass. 1980)
(party is not automatically entitled to a trial simply because state of mind is a material
element).
264. Doby v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 1162, 1170 (E.D. Va. 1981).
265. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
266. 514 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Ohio 1981), afld in part and rev'd in part, 670 F.2d 642 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 231, 74 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1982).
267. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
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of the problem would treat likelihood of confusion as a mixed question of
law and fact. Under this classification the Supreme Court would likely
favor adherence to rule 52 despite the necessity of multi-level findings by
the district courts to determine the existence of likelihood of confusion.
Courts in those circuits that consider likelihood of confusion as a question
of fact face a potential inability to render summary judgment on Lanham
Act claims that may clearly mandate such a disposition, since summary
judgment is not properly used to dispose of questions of fact. A concomi-
tant increase in the number of frivolous claims is possible because courts
may not have an effective way to prevent such claims from receiving an
undeserved trial on the merits. This problem is minor, however, when
compared with the danger of retrying entire Lanham Act cases at the ap-
pellate level. Circuits that hold that likelihood of confusion is ultimately a
question of law have created an unrestricted framework within which to
rationalize de novo review of the evidence. This unchecked review of the
often copious evidence used to determine likelihood of confusion may eas-
ily render carefully considered decisions of district courts vacuous.
Responsible jurisprudence calls for deference to the trial court's findings
when complex issues are involved, and decisions on the issue of likelihood
of confusion are impossible to dissect. Circuit courts that attempt dissec-
tion have expanded the scope of review in Lanham Act cases so that multi-
ple bases for reversal exist. This approach bypasses the boundaries of
appellate review that are necessary to ensure the functional integrity of
district courts when considering Lanham Act violations. Adherence by the
circuit courts to rule 52 when reviewing Lanham Act claims ensures proper
deference to the district courts and, at the same time, encourages the effi-
cient allocation of judicial resources. Concern for the "retrial of fact issues
under the guise of appellate review" 268 properly demands that there be
only one plateau for reversal, and circuit courts should be no less mindful
of rule 52 when reviewing Lanham Act claims than in other situations.
Only when a circuit court truly is "left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed"2 69 concerning the district court's ulti-
mate finding of likelihood of confusion should the circuit court label the
lower court's findings clearly erroneous and independently review the
evidence.
268. Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
269. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
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